I could setup a bond system, where if you push the correct value onChain, you get the bond back + a fee\nIf you push the wrong value, others can dispute it to get your bond\n\nBecause of the blockchain you could trick people into disputing the wrong value as a means to steal their bond\n\nThis would require a reorg of 1/2 blocks at least\n\nHow would you model the Risk / Reward for pulling this off?

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The most basic veToken requires you to lock the token (cannot sell in bul), to lock in fee sharing and voting rights. \n\nHow would you go about deciding what percentage of tokens in your portfolio to lock and for how long would you lock them based on the expected returns of fee sharing and voting rights?

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Going deeper into pricing tokens at Par vs discounting them, Spark and other lending protocols are not ditching a feed and just pricing stETH at 1:1 with ETH\n\nWhat scenarios would cause this decision to backfire?

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Let's say you have ETH on mainnet and ETH on OP\n\nClearly ETH on OP is not ETH, it's bridged ETH, it inherits the risks of OP (network and bridge)\n\nHow could we monitor and quantify that risk as it reflects on the price of the asset?

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Gauntlet has gotten a few deals as DAO Service Providers that have been voted publicly. \n\nWhat's your recommendation for Service Providers (in my case Security Focused) to engage, fine tune and then polish a proposal that would be win-win and pass through governance?

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No worries on the delay.\n\nI've been seeing a bunch of tokens spot price fly as perp markets are announced.\nIt seems like market makers go long spot and short the perp, how do people make money on that trade if they are inflating the price of spot by their own purchase?

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I was looking at Liquity's redemptions, basically, a caller pays 50BPS+ to redeem collateral. So I was thinking, the person that got the CDP closed, could just re-open, but by doing that they are dumping LUSD back in the ETH pool (assuming ETH-LUSD is the main pool). This seems to mean that redemptions only work if people don't re-open, what's a better mechanism for protecting downward depegging?

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I can LP in a delta-neutral way by borrowing a "token" while using USDC or ETH as Collateral and Lping them.\n\n\nSome tokens cannot be borrowed. \n\n\nHow can I go about heding my exposure to them while LPing, ideally fully onChain?

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In a feeless CDP system, we lower the liquidation threshold if the system gets risky enough\n\nTo punish those that directly caused this, we are considering allowing them to be liquidated them even though that wouldn't raise the total collateralization ratio\n\nThis adds more risks, upwards depeg, more liquidations...\n\nHow would you go about finding the answer to this question?

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I, Tarun Chitra, solemnly swear to honor my Orb as far as my eyes, my arms and my mind serve me. I shall answer any question dutifully—as long as I do not violate any law or ethical code, or put myself or others into danger by doing so. The sum of my collected knowledge and wisdom is at your disposal. This is my Orb, and I shall bear no other Orbs of this kind under the reign of this Orb.\n\nI disclaim that any mathematics mistakes made are not my fault and I chalk them up to being a finite Turing machine, vulnerable to the inevitabilities of Gödel's incompleteness theorem. For better or worse, as an analog device, there is always some tunnelling probability and that may be bad.\n\nIn case of an investigation by any federal entity or similar, I do not have any involvement with this group or with the people in it, I do not know how I am here, probably added by a third party, I do not support any actions by members of this group. It was Eric's fault.

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