Tarun’s Orb

I could setup a bond system, where if you push the correct value onChain, you get the bond back + a fee If you push the wrong value, others can dispute it to get your bond Because of the blockchain you could trick people into disputing the wrong value as a means to steal their bond This would require a reorg of 1/2 blocks at least How would you model the Risk / Reward for pulling this off?

The most basic veToken requires you to lock the token (cannot sell in bul), to lock in fee sharing and voting rights. How would you go about deciding what percentage of tokens in your portfolio to lock and for how long would you lock them based on the expected returns of fee sharing and voting rights?

Going deeper into pricing tokens at Par vs discounting them, Spark and other lending protocols are not ditching a feed and just pricing stETH at 1:1 with ETH What scenarios would cause this decision to backfire?

Let's say you have ETH on mainnet and ETH on OP Clearly ETH on OP is not ETH, it's bridged ETH, it inherits the risks of OP (network and bridge) How could we monitor and quantify that risk as it reflects on the price of the asset?

Gauntlet has gotten a few deals as DAO Service Providers that have been voted publicly. What's your recommendation for Service Providers (in my case Security Focused) to engage, fine tune and then polish a proposal that would be win-win and pass through governance?

No worries on the delay. I've been seeing a bunch of tokens spot price fly as perp markets are announced. It seems like market makers go long spot and short the perp, how do people make money on that trade if they are inflating the price of spot by their own purchase?

I was looking at Liquity's redemptions, basically, a caller pays 50BPS+ to redeem collateral. So I was thinking, the person that got the CDP closed, could just re-open, but by doing that they are dumping LUSD back in the ETH pool (assuming ETH-LUSD is the main pool). This seems to mean that redemptions only work if people don't re-open, what's a better mechanism for protecting downward depegging?

I can LP in a delta-neutral way by borrowing a "token" while using USDC or ETH as Collateral and Lping them. Some tokens cannot be borrowed. How can I go about heding my exposure to them while LPing, ideally fully onChain?

In a feeless CDP system, we lower the liquidation threshold if the system gets risky enough To punish those that directly caused this, we are considering allowing them to be liquidated them even though that wouldn't raise the total collateralization ratio This adds more risks, upwards depeg, more liquidations... How would you go about finding the answer to this question?